Arrow's 'impossibility' theorem asserts that there are no satisfactory methods of aggregating individual preferences into collective preferences in many complex situations. This result has ramifications in economics, politics, i.e., the theory of voting, and the structure of tournaments. By identifying the objects of choice with mathematical sets, and preferences with Hausdorff measures of the distances between sets, it is possible to extend Arrow's arguments from a sociological to a mathematical setting. One consequence is that notions of reversibility can be expressed in terms of the relative configurations of patterns of sets.
ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM
One of the most significant 'no-go' results discovered in the twentieth century is Arrow's theorem concerning the impossibility of devising satisfactory methods for aggregating individual preferences into collective preferences in many complex situations [1] . Arrow's arguments have given rise to a voluminous literature with wide ranging applications in economics, politics, and the organization of tournaments. The feasibility of further extending these results to areas of mathematics and physics depends on finding appropriate counterparts to Arrow's objects of choice, i.e., various social states, and reinterpreting the concept of preference in quantitative terms. One possible approach is to identify the objects of choice with mathematical sets, and to relate the associated preferences to Hausdorff's asymmetric distances between sets.
To be specific, let A, B, C, etc. denote the objects of choice, and represent the relations 
indicates the overall preference for the choice of A in virtue of majority rule.
Arrow's arguments become relevant in the slightly more complicated situation where there are three individuals who can choose among three alternatives A, B, and C. Although in this case there are many combinations of preferences that can be aggregated into collective preferences with the help of plausible schemes such as majority rule, there are some recalcitrant outliers whose antecedents date back more than two centuries [2] . Suppose, for instance that the first individual orders the objects of choice in the sequence
This is an instance where the preferences of A over B and B over C do not imply that A is preferred over C. Sequences of this kind are said to be intransitive [3] . The ambiguity is heightened still further if the remaining two individuals order their preferences in a cyclic version of Eq.(2), viz.
Clearly majority rule can't achieve a consensus in this situation. Experience shows that even more elaborate voting schemes fail to extract a fair and favored choice from such sets of intransitive preferences. Arrow's point is that this is not a matter of ingenuity but rather an impossibility: in some complex situations there is simply no reasonable method for aggregating individual preferences into a collective preference. The reasoning is based on making precise the notions of 'fair' and 'reasonable'.
Arrow lists four criteria that ought to be satisfied by any acceptable voting procedure:
1. Local and global harmony. Suppose that in a bloc of voters every individual has the same preference, say, A over B (A B), then the collective preference of the entire group is also A over B. At first sight these innocuous propositions appear to be part of any reasonable voting scheme, but more than sixty years ago Arrow discovered an astonishing twist ---these propositions are actually incompatible! This basic flaw is the reason that it is impossible to devise a general method for aggregating individual preferences into a collective preference applicable under all circumstances. The technical details of the proof are given in [1] . A more mathematically oriented treatment is presented in [4] . 
THE HAUSDORFF DISTANCE BETWEEN SETS
Let S be a planar set composed of the points s i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N S , and T be another set in the same plane composed of the points t j , 1 ≤ j ≤ N T . Further, let d(s i , t j ) denote the ordinary Euclidean distance between s i and t j . Then the Hausdorff distance from the set S to the set T is given by the radius of the smallest disk centered at any point of S that also includes at least one point of T [5] . This definition corresponds to the expression
In a similar fashion the Hausdorff distance from the set T to the set S is given by the radius of the smallest disk centered at any point of T that also includes at least one point of S.
This definition corresponds to a formula analogous to (5),
In general, these distances depend both on the configurations as well as the relative positions of the sets S and T . Consequently, the directed Hausdorff distances δ H (S → T ) and δ H (T → S) may be unequal, even though the underlying Euclidian metric d(s i , t j ) is symmetric. This is the essential property that furnishes a link between the concepts of choice and preference and the mathematical notion of a distance between sets
The transition from Arrow to Hausdorff can be illustrated with the aid of several very simple examples. Suppose that A and B are both two-point sets with the elements a 1 , a 2 ∈ A, and b 1 , b 2 ∈ B, arranged over a grid of unit squares as shown in Figure 1 . In this case the basic distance definition (5) reduces to the simpler form
The four Euclidean distances between the points in the two sets can then be displayed in the form of a 2 × 2 array
Inserting these numbers into (7) one obtains
The reverse Hausdorff distance δ H (B → A) can then be computed from the analog of (7), viz.
Again, inserting the numbers, the result is
Clearly, the numerical differences between the two Hausdorff distances are due to the fact that (10) corresponds to a 'max -min by rows' algorithm whereas (13) corresponds a 'max -min by columns' algorithm. The two parallel interpretations of the expression A B are now complete: in Arrow's language this means that the social state A is preferred over the social state B; in Hausdorff's terminology A and B are sets whose configurations and relative positions imply that the Hausdorff distance from A to B is greater than the distance from B to A.
The next increment of complexity is the Condorcet triplet Eq.(2). This intransitive sequence of preferences can also be associated with a pattern of sets. Figure 2 shows one possible arrangement of three seta A, B, C whose relative Hausdorff distances mirror the preference rankings in Eq.(2). It is easy to confirm this numerically since the A and B sets are exactly the same as in Figure 1 ; and it merely remains to evaluate the new Hausdorff distances δ H (B → C) and δ H (C → A). Following the steps of the prior calculations in Eqs. (7)- (8), we first list the Euclidian distances between the points B and C in an array
The corresponding Hausdorff distance is then
The reverse Hausdorff distance is given by
Similarly the distance between C and A can be inferred from the array
Specifically,
The last distance is given by
The equivalences between the preference rankings in Eq.(2) and the distance inequalities implicit in Figure 2 can now be listed in a unified form: 
REVERSIONS
In ordinary particle dynamics a reversal of motion is usually effected by a reversal of all velocity components. This typographical device is adequate for systems governed by differential equations, but in more general situations where the dynamical evolution is described by mathematical flows the replacement of t by −t does not necessarily correspond to a physical time reversal [6] . The disconnect between reversions and sign changes is even more drastic in Arrow's scheme of preference rankings. In this situation it seems reasonable to associate reversions with an interchange of preferences: instead of A B we presume B A. In this sense, the reverse of the Condorcet triplet Eq. (2) is
Switching preferences also implies a reversal of the inequalities in the corresponding Haus- Evidently, this perspective on reversions has no relation to the introduction of minus signs.
